Democratic institutions and political violence: the role of self-restraint

Abstract

This paper defends democracy as a mechanism to avoid violent conflict between political actors, but it questions whether the minimalist definition of democracy is sufficient to guarantee peace. Building on Przeworski’s theory, it explains how competitive, periodic, and respected elections create incentives to channel conflict within institutional frameworks. However, evidence shows that violence can still erupt even in consolidated democracies. To address this, I propose complementing the minimalist definition with the self-restraint condition: an informal norm that requires both incumbents and opposition to moderate their exercise of power so as not to prevent the effective participation of their adversaries. Drawing on the ideas of Schumpeter, Kelsen, Linz, and Bermeo, I argue that without self-control, compromise, and commitment to democratic rules, institutions lose their ability to contain conflict, which may spill into violence. In conclusion, I contend that democracy requires not only rules and elections but also an active disposition of political actors to coexist with their opponents and respect the limits of their own power.