Negative partisanship: Ethical political implications in the transition to ‘affective polarization’

Abstract

Although it is possible to argue that political polarization is not negative in itself, it is when it becomes ‘affective polarization’, that is, when in political debate rational decision-making and the collation of evidence are subordinated to a constant predominance of cognitive biases and emotional appeals. This type of polarization has an impact on at least two levels: at the political level, the high degree of rejection towards the opposition party makes it difficult, and even prevents from the beginning, the possibility of some type of agreement or coincidence; At an ethical level, certain ‘moral licenses’ are enabled with members of the opposite pole, that is, levels of aggressiveness that would not be admissible with intragroup members. One of the central causes in the increase in affective polarization is ‘negative partisanship’, that is, an emotional repulsion towards the external party that, at the level of ideological and partisan identities, can become even more relevant than attachment to one's own party. This article will delve into its characteristics, associated phenomena and ethical-political implications.